ABSTRACT
INTRODUCTION
With the rapid growth of IT environment, ubiquitous computing has been emerged. It is an intelligent environment where our daily lives are connected with computing, allowing anyone to create a network at any time and at any place. These days, wired and wireless networks have evolved into broadband convergence network(BcN) that has a type of a subscriber network through IP core network. Along with that, newly studied Ubiquitous Sensor Network(USN), which is a technology to detect human external environment is a key to comprise ubiquitous computing environment [1] .
USN, as a base network to implement ubiquitous computing, is a wireless network, consisting of many sensors with ultralight weight and low-power. Numerous sensors connected in a single network detect geographical and environmental changes, and then send a base station the detected information which will be delivered to users by a ubiquitous sensor network server [2] . But, since the USN is a broadcast-based communications network, it is easily exposed to external attack:data forgery and alteration attack through the tapping of sensor information, distribution of abnormal packets, message reuse, and a denial-of-service attack paralyzing the entire network. For the reason, it is important to encrypt and authenticate the messages that will be transmitted between nodes in order to implement a safe USN environment [3] [4] .
Therefore, in this thesis, an authentication method using Transfer Agent is proposed to improve security in USN.As for the proposed authentication method, the USN comprises sensor * 
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Manuscript received Oct 24, 2011 ; accepted Nov.21, 2011 nodes, Transfer Agent(TA) that has great operation capability and large storage space, and Authentication Server(AS). Also, a sensor node via TA acquires a session key, communicates, and updates a key. Since each node uses its own pseudo-random number generator and a random-number received from AS to generate a key, no keys are exchanged, and thus the proposed method is more efficient in safety and key management aspects than the existing method. In addition, sensor nodes use virtual IDs at the time of communications and transmit messages through TA, so MIX channels are formed. Such channels enhance security and guarantee anonymity without any additional operation of sensor nodes. Moreover, in this study, an analysis on security was conductedto make sure that the proposed authentication method satisfies security requirements of sensor network. This thesis is made of for the following chapters: in chapter 2 is described the concept of USN, the authentication and key management of the existing USN, and anonymity technique; in chapter 3 is proposed an authentication method using Transfer Agent; in chapter 4is described the results of security evaluation of the proposed authentication method; and in chapter 5 is drawn conclusions and is suggested future study direction.
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data integrity, and data freshness, and μTESLA which is a protocol to authenticate broadcasting data. The SPINS mechanism is a method to safely communicate in resource restricted USN environment. As for SNEP, each node shares a base station and a master keyK which will be used to induce all other keys. Regarding μTESLA, through time delay mechanism, a technology to generate key chain, a set of symmetric keys used to create MAC, is applied to achieve safe authentication.
In μTESLA protocol, a base station broadcasts authenticated information to each node. The base station uses a secret key to authorize a packet, and then calculates MAC for the packet. When receiving a packet, a sensor node saves the packet in a buffer, and then, at the time of key opening, the base station broadcasts a certification key to all nodes.The sensor node that receives the public key uses the key to authenticate the packet saved in the buffer. Fig. 1 presents the method to generate a key in SPINS. In the figure,F K x is a function to create a new key which is calculated when key valueK and x are entered in MAC function. The master keyK is regularly updated by a base station, and with the master key, an encryption key and an authentication key are newly created throughF K x [7] , [8] .
Fig.1. Key Generation Method of SPINS
The SPINS has the following problems: ① The more the number of nodes for authentication increases, the longer the delay time it takes. ② It is required to synchronize the time between nodes. ③ Given the characteristic of USN, splitting a time period causes high power consumption of the entire USN.
Localized Encryption and Authentication Protocol(LEAP) was proposed to minimize the exposure risk of the nodes adjacent to some exposed nodes, by using an initial key value to make different keys depending on each communications area [9] . The LEAP uses Pairwise Key setting method in which a key is not shared in the entire network, but, instead, only the nodes over the path of data transmission share a key. An attack node does not know a private key, and cluster and Pairwise keys are used only to authenticate neighboring nodes, and a group key is used only to decrypt broadcast messages. Therefore, the LEAP mechanism has an advantage in maximizing the existence of USN with a threat node.
In building USN, the security matter to be considered first is how to set a cryptographic key. The key is used for authentication between sensor nodes and for protection of information exchanged between them.
Recently, more attention has been paid on the guarantee of node anonymity in USN [10] , [11] . .If an actual ID is use for message transmission, then an attacker intercepts network traffic, and easily analyzes the traffic and recognizes a node's location. Accordingly, to design an effective and safe authentication method in USN, with the consideration of the characteristic of USN, it is necessary to make keys through minimum communicationsand generate the keys in a safe way. In addition, it is necessary to make the IDs of message sender and receiver anonymous, and thus an attacker won't be able to recognize their actual IDs.
Anonymity method
Chaum's MIX Channel plays a role as a router between a sender and a receiver. Chaum's MIX-type anonymous communications path using k number of MIX centers is presented as follows [12] , [13] . N number of receivers is described as A , A , … , A , and each receiver A keeps the corresponding relation between A and M in secret when it transmits message M . The public key of receiverB is named as E B and, the public key of sender S named asE . Here, the role of senderS is to decrypt a cryptograph of each sender, and remove random number, and then put the result in alphabetical order.
[
Step 1] Each receiverA generates k number of random numbersR , R , … , R K , and calculates the following cryptograph before transmitting it to public board.
, , … , , ,
[
Step 2] The first MIX S decrypts a received cryptograph, and removes random number R from the decrypted message, and then puts the result in alphabetical order before transmitting it to public board.
Step 3] The [
Step 2] operation is repeatedly applied to MIX S , … , S K except for the last MIX S K .
Step 4] Lastly, S K putsB , E B m in alphabetical order, and then transmit the result to public board.
MIX-type anonymous communications path method can maintain message security if at least one MIX is honest. But, it causes a lot of loads in sending and receiving messages, and leads to the failure of the entire function when some MIXs stop functioning. Despite such disadvantages, it is possible to use the method in order to improve security only if a path is short. 
AUTHENTICATION METHOD USING TRANSFERAGENTINUSN
All keys necess udo-random num
AS generates tw eparate random s separate ran use their own m which will be u ition, through ameter, a key, w a cryptography, ④ After each node's ID is identified, AS generates random numbers( R S , R ST ). All keys to be used for actual communications are generated through each node's pseudorandom number generator, the entire master key, separate master key, and random numbers(R S , R ST ) sent by As. R S is a random number to be sent to each sensor node, and R ST is a random number to be transferred to each TA.
Initial authent
⑤ AS encrypts the generated random numbers R S , R ST with sensor node A's separate master key and with TA 's separate master key, and then transmits them. And for authentication, MAC is to be added.
AS →TA :
⑥TA uses a random number(R ST ), which is drawn from the decryption of the message received from AS, to create the encryption and MAC keys necessary for communications.
⑦TA sends the sensor node the message received from.
⑧ Node A uses a random number(R S ), which is drawn from the decryption of the message received fromTA , to generate the encryption and MAC keys necessary for communications.
⑨ By removing the random numbers and temporary MAC keys used for key generation, each sensor node and TA delete the information that is to be used to create keys necessary for communications. Therefore, even though a node is in a physical danger by an attacker, the attacker can't generate keys used for other nodes only with the node's information.
Setting-up of Session Key
The node which completes its registration needs a session key for node authentication and communications when it communicates with other nodes. Each node receives from AS a session key and a VID which is used on behalf of its ID. The VID and the session key are received prior to the beginning of communications. A node which wants to communicate with other nodes receives a session key in the following process. Since the transmitted message is encrypted with each TA's separate encryption key, other TAs that received the message can't understand it. And, since the transmitted message is encrypted with a receiver's separate encryption key, a MIX channel ends up being established between AS and the node.
⑤TA and TA receives the message, and decrypts it with their own separate encryption key, and then sends the decrypted message to a relevant node.
TA → Node A : At this time, the decrypted message is also encrypted with each node's separate encryption key. So, other TAs neither know which node will receive the message nor understand the message.
⑥ The relevant node receives the message, and decrypts it.
And then, it generates a session key(K A,B ) and a MAC key (K MAC A,B ) by using a random number R E . In addition, since the node removes R E , it is impossible to know the information used for key generation.
In the process of setting up a session key, each node receives a virtual ID and a random number R E used to generate a session key from AS by using a TA which is located in each node's subnet. This communications method by way of Transfer Agent seems to increase more calculation in the entire process of setting up a session key than the existing authentication method. But in fact, without increase in calculation from a sensor node's perspective, and only with increase in calculation from the perspective of TA an AS, it is possible to step up security and provide anonymity.
Addition of Sensor node
When a sensor node does not live any longer due to its energy consumption, or when it should be replaced by a new sensor node due to leakage, the new node should get a key in USN. In the step of initial authentication and registration, the newly added sensor node receives from AS the entire master keyK M , and a random number R X , and save them. After that, it creates its separate master key(K M C ) and a temporary MAC key(K MAC X ) based on its own ID. Through the new sensor node's ID, AS also saves the sensor node's separate master key into a database. After the new sensor node is installed, it sets up keys necessary for communications through the following steps. This is fundamentally equal to initial authentication and registration process.
① New Node C is installed additionally. And then, it uses the separate master key(K M C ) created with its own ID(ID C ) to select ID and a random number(R C ), and then encrypts them. In addition, for authentication, it creates MAC with a temporary MAC key(K MAC X ), and then sends it to TA . Node C →TA :E K M C , ID , R C ||MAC K MAC X , ID C ||R C ②TA encrypts its own ID(ID TA ) and the message received from the Node C with its own encryption key(K TA ), and sends them to AS. ④ When the ID is identified, AS transmits a random number( R S ). Keys used for actual communications are generated through each node's pseudo-random number generator, the entire master key, separate master key, and the random number(R S ) sent by AS. R S is a common random number which is delivered to sensor nodes in the entire network.
⑤ AS encrypts the random number R S with the Node C's separate master key, and then encrypts it again with TA 's separate encryption key before sending it. In addition, MAC is added for authentication.
⑥TA decrypts the message received from AS, and then sends it to the Node C.
TA → Node C :E K M C , R S ||R C ||MAC K MAC X , R S ||R C ⑦ The Node C uses the random number (R S ) which is drawn after the message received fromTA is decrypted in order to create the encryption MAC keys necessary for communications.
⑧ By removing the random number( R S ) used for key generation, the Node C deletes the information which will be used to generate the keys for communications.
Disposal of Sensor node
When a sensor node is in a physical danger by an attacker or fails to do its work, the sensor node should be scrapped. At this time, if the sensor node's key information is leaked, the entire network can be damaged. Accordingly, such keys should be newly updated. Regarding the key update process, when only the sensor nodes in a relevant subnet are updated, unnecessary operation of the entire network and energy consumption can reduce. First, AS removes the ID and the keys of the node which will be scrapped from a database. After that, keys are updated in the following process. ② The generated random number (R S ) is encrypted with TA 's separate encryption key, and MAC is added before transmission.
③TA broadcasts the message to all nodes in the relevant subject to deliver the new random number R S .
TA →Node :E K M , R S ||MAC K MAC X , R S ④ Each node decrypts the message, and then uses the new random number R S to update the keys which could be exposed to a danger caused by the scrapped sensor node.
⑤ By removing the random number (R S ), each node deletes all the information used for key update.
Key Update
If the same key is used for a long time, it is possible for the key to be leaked.Accordingly, keys used in USN should be updated at a certain period of time. Keys are updated in the way that AS creates new random numbers (R S , R ST ) and deliver them to the entire network, and thus each node updates the entire master key(K M ) and TA's entire master key(K MT ). With the updated master keysK M andK MT , each object updates its separate master key, and mixes the updated master keys with newly delivered random numbers to update all keys used for communications.
① AS generates new random numbers R S , R ST .
② The generated random numbers are encrypted with TA's master key, and are transmitted after the addition of MAC.
③ TA uses the random number (R ST ) which is drawn after the message received from AS is encrypted in order to update all keys necessary for communications.
④ The new random number R S is transferred to each node.
Each node uses the number to update all keys necessary for communications.
⑤ BY removing the transmitted random numbers (R S , R ST ), TA and each node deletes the information used for key update.
PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Security Analysis
For the analysis on the proposed authentication method's safety and security, the comparison of the proposed method and the existing ones is presented in the Table 3 as follows. The security requirements in USN are confidentiality, mutual authentication, integrity, anonymity and freshness [14] . On the basis of the setting-up of a session key necessary for authentication between sensor nodes, which is proposed in this thesis, the security requirements in USN are analyzed as follows.
(1) Guarantee of Confidentiality Some important messages like a key exchange message should be guaranteed in terms of their confidentiality. Since sensor nodes communicate with each other wirelessly, they are exposed to trapping. In the case of the authentication method proposed in this thesis, keys are not transferred directly, for each node generates keys by using its own pseudo-random
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number generator. Also, as for the method, the messages are encrypted with encryption keys based on symmetric key algorithm, and then are transmitted. Therefore, even though an attacker achieves successful tapping, it is impossible to recognize secret keys between TS and AS, and between a sensor node and AS. As a result, the proposed method guarantees confidentiality.
(2) Guarantee of Mutual Authentication Data authentication is the most significant security requirements in USN.As for the authentication method proposed in this thesis, a sensor node creates MAC with a oneto-one key to communicate with a target node in every step of setting up a session-key. Therefore, through this method, it is possible to authenticate data as to whether the data are altered by an attacker.In addition, since AS holds the IDs of TA and sensor nodes, it is possible to achieve ID-based object authentication hierarchically and block malicious nodes at the very onset.
(3) Guarantee of Integrity As for the authentication method proposed in this thesis, messages are encrypted with a MAC key used for a one-to-one communications so that the message integrity is guaranteed. Also, as for the method, since the random numbers used for key generation at the initial step of setting up keys are removed, it is impossible for any attackers to generate keys.
(4) Guarantee of Freshness Data freshness means the protection of data reuse. Generally, it is divided into weak freshness and strong freshness. In order to compare request message and reply message, the weak freshness only uses count value, and the strong freshness uses random numbers. As for the authentication method proposed in this thesis, each node generates random numbers in every communications step so that it provides strong freshness.
(5) Lightweight The hardware performance of a sensor node is extremely limited. Therefore, as for the proposed authentication method, messages are encrypted/decrypted through RC5 and CBC modes.As a symmetric encryption algorithm, RC5has a fast speed and uses a small memory so that it is proper to apply it to a sensor node. And, to create MAC used for authentication, CBC-MAC is used in the method. As a result, the storage space of a sensor node can reduce.
(6) Guarantee of Anonymity Since sensor nodes engaging in communications use virtual IDs, they can be protected against impersonation attack caused by the exposure of a node identifier. As for the proposed authentication method, after registering the transfer details and IDs of internal nodes, nodes can communicate through their virtual IDs. Also, since a MIX channel between nodes is formed through TA, each node's information is not exposed to TA, an intermediate agent. Therefore, in this way, the proposed method guarantees anonymity.
The authentication method proposed in this thesis was analyzed from the security perspective. Table 4 presents various types of attacks and the security evaluation of the proposed method about the attacks. Since a random number selected by a relevant node is attached to the messages to be sent, a sensor node is safe from replay attack, and guarantees strong freshness.
Impersonation Attack
At the time of setting up a session key, as shown in the functionVID A H ID A , R E , a VID is created, and then a random number used for key generation is removed. Therefore, it is impossible for an attacker to predict a random number.
Conspiracy Attack
When n number of TAs conspires to know VID, they need a sensor node's separate encryption key. In the proposed method, it is impossible for the separate encryption key to be exposed. So, each sensor node is safe from the conspiracy attack.
Nonrepudiation
In the case that a TA engaging in communications repudiates the receipt of messages, the messages can be transmitted only after they are encrypted and decrypted with the secret key of TA which is located in a relevant subnet.
Efficiency Analysis
For analysis on efficiency of the authentication method proposed in this thesis, the execution time of algorithm was calculated. In addition, the proposed method was compared with KARL method [15] both in the same subnet and different subnet. As for the algorithm execution time, execution time of the algorithm running in a single node(SN ) was calculated, and the total algorithm execution time(Tot ) was calculated by multiplying SN by the number of passing nodes(PN).
The symbols necessary to calculate algorithm execution time are presented in Table 5 .
SN
IQ KG KA EC DC AC(3) Tot SN PN(4) A single subnet comprising 50 sensors is built in the form of square, and thus a total of 450 sensors make up a network. A sensor node is deployed at fixed intervals of 10m 10m.
As for the route length between nodes to communicate from Node A to Node B(Node A Node B), the shortest route node is set as node 5, and the longest route node is set as node 13 if the two nodes are in the same subnet. TA and AS feature 2.4GHz, 250kbps, and 915Mhz so that they have better operation ability than general sensor nodes, and sensor nodes have operation ability of a node defined in Smart Dust.To shorten the algorithm execution time of a sensor node, the processes of key generation and authentication are designed to be performed on TA which has better performance than general sensor nodes.
The communications method of to calculate the execution time is presented as follows. Fig. 3 and Fig.4 illustrate the graphs of the total algorithm execution time both in the case that the two nodes are in the same subject and in the case that the two nodes are in different subnets. The proposed method has larger number of nodes than the KAL method, since the communications require the passing of TA and AS. Nevertheless, in the case of the shortest length in the same subnet, the proposed method has a large number of operations in the TA and AS aspects and has a small number of node operations so that the proposed method shows remarkably less execution time than the KARL method. But, in the case of the longest distance environment where there are relatively larger node operations, the algorithm execution time in the proposed method increases by 3.128/byte. On the other hand, in the case of the communications in different subnets, as the number of nodes increase, the proposed method shows faster algorithm execution time by 13.804/byte than the KARL method which requires a lot of operations in the aspect of a sensor node.
CONCLUSIONS
All sensor nodes in USN, which participate in communications, have only limited battery power. Sensor nodes in the USN environment consume a lot of their power due to the overheads caused by key generation, encryption/decryption, and operation for authentication.
Since the authentication method proposed in this thesis uses RC5 encryption algorithm and CBC-MAC function, it is appropriate for the method to be applied to the ubiquitous sensor network that has weak capability for computing operation. Moreover, because the proposed method took into account the limitation of operation and low-power caused by the smallness and lightweight of a sensor node, it was possible to minimize the operation and communications traffic of a node. In addition, since the method uses a virtual ID assigned to each session, even though an illegal user taps communications and receipt messages, privacy is guaranteed, and the personal information of users in USN is protected in the registration and authentication step.In particular, by inducing TA, the proposed method increased the calculation only in TA and AS aspects, without imposing any burden on sensor nodes. In doing so, the method realized anonymity.
In the future, it is necessary to study a method through which, according to a circumstance, users can be authenticated and session keys can be shared, while anonymity is being guaranteed.
